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Abstract:  
This paper documents and explains the positive comovement between external and 
budget deficits for several developing countries. First, the covariance estimated from 
post-1960 time-series data is numerically positive for each of the 24 countries and 
statistically significant for almost all cases. This is consistent with previous findings 
obtained from panel regressions. Second, the empirical covariance is close to that 
predicted from a tractable small open economy, overlapping generation model with 
heterogeneous goods. Also, the predicted covariance is induced by shocks which are 
closely related to internal conditions such as domestic resources and fiscal policies, and 
to a much lesser extent to external conditions such as the world interest rate, real 
exchange rate, and terms of trade. This structural analysis explaining the joint behavior 
of external and budget deficits sharply contrasts with earlier reduced-form studies 
characterizing the individual behavior of either the external deficit or budget deficit. 
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1. Introduction
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we document the comovement between
external and budget deficits for several developing countries. Second, we explain this
comovement from a structural model capturing the joint behavior of external and budget
deficits.
Earlier studies highlight the existence of a positive comovement for developing countries,
as the external balance deteriorates when the budget deficit increases. These analyses
mainly rely on panel regressions to extract the comovement that is common across coun-
tries. Empirically, the estimated coefficient relating the external deficit to the budget
deficit is always statistically positive (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and Zanforlin 2007; Gruber
and Kamin 2007; Chinn and Prasad 2003; Calderon, Chong, and Loayza 2002). A simi-
lar effect is recovered from the estimated coefficient relating private saving to the budget
deficit and the identity stating that the current account corresponds to national saving
minus investment (Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei 1998). The robust comovement between
external and budget deficits across developing countries sharply contrasts with the het-
erogeneous comovement documented for industrial countries (e.g. Boileau and Normandin
2008; Chinn and Prasad 2003).
This paper provides additional evidence of the presence of a positive comovement between
external and budget deficits for developing countries. Our analysis relies exclusively on
the time-series of external and budget deficits to extract the comovement that is specific
to each country. The time-series are annual observations covering the longest period for
the post-1960 era for 24 developing countries. Our primary measure of the comovement
corresponds to the sample estimate of the covariance between external and budget deficits
for each country. The findings reveal that this empirical covariance is numerically positive
for all countries and statistically significant for many cases. Similar results are obtained
when the comovement is measured by the estimated correlation between external and
budget deficits, and the estimated slope coefficient obtained by regressing the external
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deficit on a constant and the budget deficit.
Also, previous studies rely on reduced forms to explain either the individual behavior of
the external deficit or budget deficit, rather than their joint behavior. However, combining
the results obtained in these studies suggest that the explanation of the positive comove-
ment between external and budget deficits from the usual internal and external conditions
represents a challenging task. For example, an increase of output implies that the exter-
nal deficit sometimes increases significantly (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and Zanforlin 2007;
Calderon, Chong, and Loayza 2002) and sometimes it does not (e.g. Chinn and Prasad
2003), whereas the budget deficit and the governments’ borrowing possibilities are not
significantly affected (e.g. Combes and Saadi-Sedik 2006; Roubini 1991; Berg and Sachs
1988). An increase of the world interest rate induces the external deficit to significantly
decreases (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and Loayza 2002), while the probability of rescheduling
the public debt statistically increases such that the budget deficit may increase (e.g. Berg
and Sachs 1988). An improvement of the terms of trade implies that the external deficit
significantly decreases (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and Zanforlin 2007; Chinn and Prasad 2003;
Calderon, Chong, and Loayza 2002), whereas the budget deficit significantly increases (e.g.
Combes and Saadi-Sedik 2006). Finally, an improvement of the real exchange rate uni-
formely leads to a significant decline of the external deficit, but the effect on the budget
deficit has not been studied so far.
In contrast to early work, this paper relies on a structural analysis to capture the joint be-
havior of external and budget deficits. Specifically, we use a tractable small open economy,
overlapping generation model with heterogeneous goods to explain the positive comove-
ment between external and budget deficits. The model offers the advantage of involving
the external conditions which are often considered for developing countries, such as the
world interest rate, real exchange rate, and terms of trade. Also, the model relates the
external and budget deficits to the internal conditions associated with domestic resources
and fiscal policies, where these policies may reflect, among other things, changes of the
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government’s abilities to collect taxes due to corruption, black markets, or informal mar-
kets, for example. Furthermore, the model captures different degrees of imperfectness of
intergenerational linkages and financial markets, and as such potential liquidity constraints
faced by developing countries.
The parameters of the model are estimated for each country such that the predicted co-
variance between external and budget deficits is close to its empirical counterpart. The
predicted covariance is then decomposed into contributions measuring the portions at-
tributable to shocks associated with each internal and external conditions. The contribu-
tions with large positive values provide information on the shocks corresponding to prime
determinants of the positive comovement between external and budget deficits.
The results reveal that the contributions are almost always positive, so that most shocks
induce a positive relation between external and budget deficits for all countries. Also, the
magnitude of the contributions indicate that both internal and external conditions play a
role in the determination of the comovement between external and budget deficits. How-
ever, the contributions suggest that the shocks associated with internal conditions, and
especially domestic resources net of public absorptions, are the most important factors
explaining the positive comovement between texternal and budget deficits for most coun-
tries. In contrast, the shocks associated with external conditions are dominant for only few
countries. Finally, a robustness analysis confirms that these contributions can be viewed
as providing a lower bound of the importance of internal conditions in the determination
of the positive comovement between external and budget deficits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the empirical comove-
ment between external and budget deficits for several developing countries. Section 3
presents the model to explain the joint behavior of external and budget deficits. Section 4
elaborates the empirical method to decompose the predicted covariance between external
and budget deficits. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Empirical Regularities
This section documents the comovement between external and budget deficits for develop-
ing countries. Our sample includes annual observations covering the longest period since
the post-1960 era for 12 countries in Africa, 7 countries in the Americas, 4 countries in
Asia, and 1 country in Oceania. The selections of the countries, frequency, and time pe-
riods are dictated by the availability of the data. In particular, there are several missing
values for the budget deficit for many developing countries. The data are fully described
in the Data Appendix.
Figure 1 displays the external and budget deficits. The external deficit refers to the negative
of the ratio of nominal current account to nominal gross domestic product. The budget
deficit corresponds to the ratio of nominal budget deficit to nominal gross domestic product.
Visual inspection of the plots suggests the existence of a positive comovement between
external and budget balances. For many countries, the external and budget positions seem
to move in the same direction for most time periods. In general, these movements translate
into both external and budget deficits over prolonged horizons. In some cases, however,
these movements lead to external balances alternating between deficits and surpluses over
time with persistent budget deficits as for Nigeria, South Africa, and Venezuela.
Table 1 reports statistics summarizing the comovements between external and budget
deficits. The first statistic is the empirical covariance between external and budget deficits
(multiplied by 10000). Later on, the covariance will prove useful to perform a decomposi-
tion allowing the identification of the main explanatory factors of the comovement between
external and budget deficits. The second statistic is the correlation between external and
budget deficits. Correlations are frequently used in business-cycle studies to document
comovements between variables (e.g. Mendoza 1995). The last statistic is the slope co-
efficient obtained by regressing the external deficit on a constant and the budget deficit.
Slope coefficients are often used in reduced-form analyses to assess the relation between
external and budget deficits (e.g. Chinn and Prasad 2003). All statistics are computed
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from the stationary, linearly detrended, external and budget deficits. Similar results are
obtained from alternative detrending methods, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
The statistics indicate the existence of a positive comovement between external and budget
deficits. For example, the empirical covariance between external and budget deficits is
numerically positive for all countries. The covariance averages to 9.559 across all countries;
it ranges from a low of 0.061 in Burundi to a high of 45.34 in Togo; and it is larger than
10 for 10 countries, between 5 and 10 for 6 countries, and between 1 and 5 for 5 countries.
The covariance is statistically significant at the 1% level for 11 countries, at the 10% level
for 6 additional countries, and at the 25% level for 3 more countries.
Also, the correlation between external and budget deficits is numerically positive for all
countries. The correlation averages to 0.472 across all countries; it ranges from a low of
0.007 in Burundi to a high of 0.848 in Sri Lanka; and it is larger than 0.75 for 5 countries,
between 0.50 and 0.75 for 6 countries, and between 0.25 and 0.50 for 7 countries. The
correlation is statistically significant at the 1% level for 15 countries, at the 10% level for
4 additional countries, and at the 25% level for 2 more countries.
Finally, the slope coefficient relating the external deficit to the budget deficit is numerically
positive for all countries. The slope coefficient averages to 0.724 across all countries; it
ranges from a low of 0.007 in Burundi to a high of 1.876 in Venezuela; it is larger than
1.00 for 4 countries, between 0.75 and 1.00 for 7 countries, and between 0.25 and 0.75 for 9
countries. The slope coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level for 12 countries,
at the 10% level for 4 additional countries, and at the 25% level for 5 more countries.
Overall, the statistics reveal the existence of a positive comovement between external
and budget deficits for many developing countries. This robust result is consistent with
previous findings, where the estimated coefficient relating the external deficit to the budget
deficit is statistically positive for panels of developing countries (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and
Zanforlin 2007; Gruber and Kamin 2007; Chinn and Prasad 2003; Calderon, Chong, and
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Loayza 2002). However, this sharply contrasts with the heterogeneous results documented
for industrial countries. For example, the covariance between external and budget deficits
is numerically positive for only half of the OECD countries, and the estimated coefficient
relating the external deficit to the budget deficit is no longer significant for panels of
industrial countries (e.g. Boileau and Normandin 2008; Chinn and Prasad 2003).
3. The Economic Environment
This section presents the economic environment explaining the joint behavior of external
and budget deficits. This environment relies on a structural small open economy, overlap-
ping generation model with heterogeneous goods. The model involves the usual external
conditions related to the world interest rate, real exchange rate, and terms of trade, as
well as internal conditions such as domestic resources and fiscal policies reflecting changes
of taxes or changes of the government’s abilities to collect taxes. The model also captures
different degrees of imperfectness of intergenerational linkages and of financial markets.
In the model, each domestic consumer born at time s sloves in period t the following
problem:
maxEt
∞∑
j=0
βj(1− ρ)j
C1−γs,t+j
1− γ
, (1.1)
s.t. Cs,t =
[
ω
1
ξ (CTs,t)
ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω)
1
ξ (CNs,t)
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1 , (1.2)
CTs,t =
[
$
1
ζ (CHs,t)
ζ−1
ζ + (1−$)
1
ζ (CFs,t)
ζ−1
ζ
] ζ
ζ−1 , (1.3)
(1− ρ)(Bs,t+1 + Fs,t+1) = (1 + rt)(Bs,t + Fs,t) + Ys,t − Ts,t − PtCs,t. (1.4)
Equation (1.1) specifies the utility function in terms of private consumption of a composite
good. Equation (1.2) defines this consumption in terms of tradable and non-tradable goods.
Equation (1.3) expresses tradable consumption in terms of home and foreign tradable
goods. Equation (1.4) depicts the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer.
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All the variables are measured in terms of home tradable goods. Specifically, Cs,t is an
index of private consumption, CNs,t is the consumption of non-tradable goods, CTs,t is the
consumption of tradable goods, CFs,t is the consumption of foreign tradable goods, and
CHs,t is the consumption of home tradable goods. Pt, PNt , PTt , PFt , and PHt are the
corresponding price indices, with the normalization PHt = 1. Bs,t is the purchase of
one-period bonds issued by the domestic government, Fs,t is the purchase of one-period
bonds issued by the foreign government, rt is the world interest rate on one-period bonds,
Ts,t is lump-sum taxes, and Ys,t = Y Hs,t + PNt Y Ns,t is the value of output, where Y Hs,t and
Y Ns,t are resources of home tradable and non-tradable goods. The term Et represents the
expectation operator conditional on information available in period t.
Also, the parameter β corresponds to the discount factor, γ is the reciprocal of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of consumption, ξ is the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods, ζ is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign tradable goods, ω is the weight of tradable goods in total consumption, and $
is the weight of home tradable goods in total tradable consumption. The parameter ρ is
the probability of being dead next period, or equivalently, the death and birth rates when
the population is constant (e.g. Blanchard 1985). Consequently, ρ = 0 indicates that the
domestic economy is described by an infinitely-lived representative consumer model, so
that agents fully smooth their consumption. Conversely, ρ = 1 implies that the domestic
environment is represented by a sequence of static economies in which each cohort is fully
replaced in the subsequent period by a different cohort, such that agents consume only their
current income. The parameter ρ may be related to the imperfectness of intergenerational
linkages. In this context, a large value of ρ indicates that consumers are not altruistic, so
that agents prefer a consumption profile which is not fully smoothed. Alternatively, ρ may
be related to the degree of imperfectness of financial markets. In this case, a large value of
ρ indicates that consumers experience difficulties in selling or buying bonds, so that agents
are unable to fully smooth consumption through time.
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The domestic public sector is described as:
(Bt+1 +B∗t+1) = (1 + rt)(Bt + B∗t ) + PtGt − Tt, (2.1)
= (Bt + B∗t ) +Dt. (2.2)
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) correspond to the intertemporal budget constraint of the gov-
ernment. The variables without the subscript s refer to aggregate variables. In particular,
B∗t is the aggregate foreign purchases of one-period domestic bonds, Gt is the public con-
sumption of goods, and Dt is the budget deficit including the service of the debt.
The external deficit of the domestic economy is measured as the negative of the current
account. The current account is:
Zt = (Ft+1 − Ft)− (B∗t+1 − B∗t ). (3)
Equation (3) defines the current account as the change of net foreign asset positions.
The model (1)–(3) is solved from an analytical approximation. This approximation is
fully described in a technical appendix available from the authors. In brief, the individ-
ual consumption function is derived, first, from the Euler equation associated with (1.1)
and (1.4) and the distributional assumption of log normality (e.g. Campbell and Mankiw
1989), and, second, from the expected integrated budget constraint associated with (1.4)
which is linearized around the means (e.g. Campbell and Deaton 1989). Then, the ag-
gregate consumption function is derived from the individual consumption function and
the assumptions that all consumers alive in a given time period face identical taxes and
have the same tradable and non-tradable outputs (e.g. Gali 1991). The current account
function is derived from the definition (3), the aggregate budget constraints associated
with (1.4) and (2.1), and the aggregate consumption function. To highlight the relation
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between external and budget deficits, the current account function is rewritten by sub-
stituting aggregate taxes from the expected integrated budget constraint associated with
(2.1) and (2.2), which is linearized around the means (e.g. Normandin 1999). Finally, the
consumer price indices associated with (1.2) and (1.3) are log-linearized around the means
of exchange rate and terms of trade. The exchange rate is defined as qt = (PNt /PTt ). The
terms of trade correspond to τt = (PHt /PFt ).
The analytical approximation yields the following first-order vector autoregression (VAR):
x1,t = Θ11x1,t−1 +Θ12x2,t, (4)
or more explicitly,
(
pt+1
zt
)
=
(
Θpp 0
Θzp 0
)(
pt
zt−1
)
+
(
Θpf Θpa
Θzf 1
)(
ft
at
)
,
with
at = ΘafEt
∞∑
j=1
λjft+j . (5)
The process (4) corresponds to the rules for the predetermined and nonpredetermined
variables. Equation (5) represents the purely forward-looking component of the rules.
All the variables are demeaned. The predetermined variables are pt =
( (ft − b∗t ) (bt + b∗t ) )
′, where (ft− b∗t ) = (Ft−B∗t )/Yt−1 and (bt+ b∗t ) = (Bt+B∗t )/Yt−1.
The nonpredetermined variable is zt = Zt/Yt. The forcing variables are ft =
( rt ∆ log τt ∆ log qt ∆ logYt log gt dt )′, where ∆ is the first difference operator,
gt = PtGt/Yt, and dt = Dt/Yt. The forcing variables include the typical exogenous
stochastic variables for small open economies. These variables reveal information on ex-
ternal conditions related to interest rate (rt), terms of trade (∆ log τt), and exchange rate
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(∆ log qt), as well as on internal conditions related to domestic resources (∆ logYt), net of
public absorptions (log gt), and fiscal policies (dt). Specifically, the budget deficit provides
information on taxes, since government expenditures and debt service are given (that is,
gt and rt are exogenous, and (bt + b∗t ) is predetermined). Also, the variables zt and dt
are consistent with the measures used to document the empirical positive comovement
between external and budget deficits (see Section 2). For convenience, at is termed the
adjusted current account.
Table 2 relates the coefficients of the rules to the structural parameters and the means
of the variables. These coefficients reveal that the rules are static when the probability
of death is unity (ρ = 1, so that λ = 0). In this case, the current account is exclusively
affected by contemporaneous output and budget deficit (see the nonzero elements of Θzf ).
First, the current account improves following an increase of ouput, through a positive
wealth effect. Second, the current account deteriorates following an increase of budget
deficit, since it reflects a tax-cut which leads to an increase of consumption (including that
of foreign tradable goods). This translates into a positive relation between external and
budget deficits. As explained above, this relation can be due to non-altruistic behavior
associated with imperfect intergenerational linkages or to liquidity constraints related to
imperfect financial markets.
In contrast, the rules are dynamic when the probability of death is smaller than one
(0 ≤ ρ < 1, so that 0 < λ < 1). In this case, the current account is affected by all expected
future forcing variables (see the elements of Θaf ). First, the current account deteriorates
in response to an expected increase of output and an expected decrease of government
expenditures, since this expected increase of resources, net of public absorption, induces
an increase of current consumption (including that of foreign tradable goods). Second,
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption exceeds one, then the
current account may deteriorate in response to an expected decrease of interest rate, an
expected appreciation of exchange rate, and an expected deterioration of terms of trade,
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through the intertemporal substitution effects associated with an increase of price of future
consumption relative to current consumption, an increase of price of future non-tradable
goods relative to future tradable goods, and an increase of price of future foreign tradable
goods relative to future home tradable goods. Finally, a positive probability of death
implies that the current account deteriorates in response to an expected increase of the
budget deficit, whereas a zero probability of death implies that the current account is
unaffected because the contemporaneous consumption is unaltered while private saving
increases to reimburse the budget deficit induced by a tax-cut. Hence, a zero probability
of death implies that there is no relation between external and budget deficits.
The analytical approximation is completed by constructing the expectations of future
forcing variables in (5) from a first-order unrestricted VAR process involving all forcing
variables and the adjusted current account (e.g. Boileau and Normandin 2002). This yields
the restricted VAR process:
x2,t = Θ22x2,t−1 +Θ2uut. (6)
Here x2,t = ( f ′t at )
′, whereas ut and Θ2uut contain the innovations of the unrestricted
and restricted VARs. Also, Φ22 and Θ22 = Θ2uΦ22Θ−12u include the feedback coefficients
of the unrestricted and restricted VARs, where Θ2u = ( e′1 . . . e′6 Υ )
′, ek contains the
value one for the kth element and zero elsewhere, Υ = ΘafΦ22λ
[
I−Φ22λ
]−1, and I is the
identity matrix. Some of the feedback coefficients reflect the dynamic interactions between
the contemporaneous budget deficit and the expected forcing variables related to future
internal and external conditions. This response of the budget deficit and the response of
the current account (discussed above) to expected movements of future forcing variables
may induce a positive relation between external and budget deficits.
Finally, the VARs (4) and (6) are stacked to form the following first-order representation:
xt = Θxxt−1 +Θuut, (7)
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or
(
x1,t
x2,t
)
=
(
Θ11 Θ12Θ22
0 Θ22
)(
x1,t−1
x2,t−1
)
+
(
Θ12Θ2u
Θ2u
)
ut.
This representation will prove useful to isolate the key factors inducing a positive relation
between external and budget deficits.
4. Empirical Method
This section elaborates the empirical method designed to estimate the parameters of system
(7) and to identify the main determinants of the positive comovement between external and
budget deficits. Ideally, the empirical method should jointly estimate all the parameters
of system (7). In practice, however, this exercise is difficult to perform given the large
number of parameters to estimate relative to the number of observations. Specifically, there
is a total of 64 parameters which include (i) the means µy, µq, µτ , µr, µg, µd, µ(f−b∗),
uc, and ut associated with the variables ∆ logYt, log qt, log τt, rt, log gt, dt, (ft − b∗t ),
log ct = log(PtCt/Yt), and log tt = log(Tt/Yt), (ii) the feedback coefficients incorporated
in Φ22 for the unrestricted version of the VAR (6), and (iii) the structural coefficients ρ,
γ, ξ, ζ, ω, and $ involved in the agent’s problem (1). In contrast, the samples for our
different countries include between 24 and 44 annual observations per variable.
To circumvent this problem, we apply the following multi-step estimation procedure. The
first step evaluates the means from the sample estimates. The second step determines
the feedback coefficients from the OLS estimates. To do so, the variables involved in
the unrestricted version of (6) are obtained by using the actual data for forcing variables,
current account, and predetermined variables; by constructing the adjusted current account
as at = zt−Θzppt−Θzf ft (see the last equation of (4)); and by fixing the means to their
estimates and the structural parameter ρ to a given value (see Table 2).
The third step computes the structural parameters from the GMM estimates. These
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estimates are obtained by setting the covariance between external and budget deficits, cov,
to its empirical counterpart (reported in Table 1), by fixing the means and the feedback
coefficients to their estimates and by exploting the following moment conditions:
E
[
(cov + ztdt)x′2,t−1
]
= 0, (8)
where x2,t−1 is the vector of instruments, while zt and dt are substituted by the values
predicted by system (7)
zt = e′3xt =e′3
(
Θxxt−1 +Θuut
)
, (9.1)
dt = e′9xt =e′9
(
Θxxt−1 +Θuut
)
. (9.2)
To gain intuition, note that the GMM estimates select values for the structural parameters
involved in the nonlinear regression cov = −ztdt+ t such that the error term t is orthog-
onal to lagged information, where zt and dt are given by (9). Taking expectations implies
that E(cov) = −E(ztdt) + E(t) or cov = −σzd provided that the error term is centered
on zero, so that the estimated structural parameters ensure that the predicted covariance
between external and budget deficit, −σzd, is close to its empirical counterpart, cov. In
practice, the GMM estimates are obtained for the structural parameters ρ and γ and for
the composite parameters q = 1+
(1−ω
ω
)
e(1−ξ)µq and τ = 1+
(1−$
$
)
e(1−ζ)µτ , given that
the structural parameters ω, $, ξ, and ζ are not individually identified.
The last step of the estimation procedure consists in repeating the second and third steps.
More explicitly, the estimate of ρ obtained in the third step is used in the second step to
reestimate the feedback coefficients Φ22. These new estimates of Φ22 are then used in the
third step to update the estimate of ρ. These iterations are done until the estimates of the
structural parameter ρ and those in Φ22 converge to fix points.
The empirical procedure then uses the estimates of parameters to evaluate and decompose
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the predicted covariance between external and budget deficits. Specifically, the predicted
covariances between variables governed by system (7) are given by:
Σ =
∞∑
j=0
ΘjxΘuΩΘ
′
uΘ
j
x
′, (10.1)
=
∞∑
j=0
ΨjΨ′j . (10.2)
Here, Σ = E[xtx′t] is the predicted covariance matrix, Ω = E[utu′t] = ΛΛ′ is the
covariance matrix of innovations, Ψj = ΘjxΘuΛ is the matrix summarizing the dy-
namic responses of various variables j periods after each orthogonal shock, and Λ is a
lower triangular matrix transforming the innovations into orthogonal shocks. In prac-
tice, Λ is obtained from a Choleski factorization for the ordering x2,t = ( f ′t at )
′ and
ft = ( rt ∆ log τt ∆ log qt ∆ logYt log gt dt )′. This ordering ensures that the shocks
related to internal conditions capture the portion that is orthogonal to external conditions.
Also, the shock related to log gt corresponds to a shock on the level of government expen-
ditures, rather than on government expenditures to output ratio, given that it captures the
portion that is orthogonal to output. Likewise, the shock related to dt is a shock on taxes,
since it measures the portion that is orthogonal to output, government expenditures, and
interest rates. Finally, the shock affecting at captures any other shocks than those already
associated with ft, because it is the portion that is orthogonal to forcing variables.
From expression (10), the predicted covariance between external and budget deficits is
decomposed as follows:
−σzd = ψr + ψτ + ψq + ψy + ψg + ψd + ψa. (11)
The component ψr =
∑∞
j=0
(
−e′3Ψje4
)(
e′9Ψje4
)
is the portion of the predicted covariance
between external and budget deficits which is attributable to the interest rate shock. In
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practice, this portion is computed by evaluating the sum over 100 years. Also, the portion
involves the dynamic responses of the external deficit [i.e.
(
−e′3Ψje4
)
] and of the budget
deficit [i.e.
(
e′9Ψje4
)
] to an interest rate shock. The other terms in (11) are defined in
an analogous way. The components ψτ , ψq, ψy, ψg, ψd, and ψa measure the contributions
to the predicted covariance of the terms of trade shock, exchange rate shock, output
shock, government expenditures shock, tax shock, and other shocks. The component with
the largest positive value provides information on the shock corresponding to the prime
determinant of the positive comovement between external and budget deficits.
5. Results
This section applies the empirical method just described for 12 of our 24 initial countries.
The selection of the countries relies on the availability of the data required for the estima-
tion exercise. In particular, the series on public debt are often missing. The data are fully
described in the Data Appendix.
The estimates of all parameters are available upon request. For briefness, Table 3 reports
only the estimates of the structural and composite parameters. The estimates systemati-
cally display the expected signs and the appropriate magnitudes, but are often imprecise
since the number of estimated parameters is large relative to the sample size. Specifically,
the estimates indicate that the probability of death, ρ, is always between zero and one.
Also, the probability of death averages to 0.318 across all countries; and it ranges from a
low of 0.001 in Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia to a high of 0.948 in Sierra
Leone. As explained above, large values of ρ may reflect non-altruistic behavior associ-
ated with imperfect intergenerational linkages or liquidity constraints related to imperfect
financial markets. Interestingly, previous findings detect strong liquidity constraints for
many developing countries (e.g. Haque and Montiel 1989). Among the countries which are
common to our sample, severe liquidity constraints are documented for India, Malaysia,
and Nigeria, whereas no liquidity constraint is detected for Morocco. Our estimates accord
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with these results, that is, the estimates of the probability of death are substantially larger
for India, Malaysia, and Nigeria than that for Morocco.
The estimates imply that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, (1/γ),
is always positive. Also, the elasticity averages to 0.719 across all countries; and it ranges
from a low of 0.139 in South Africa to a high of 4.016 in Tunisia. Interestingly, these
estimates are consistent with previous findings, where the estimates of the elasticity are
smaller than unity for almost all selected developing countries (e.g. Ogaki, Ostry, and
Reinhart 1996; Ostry and Reinhart 1992; Giovannini 1985).
As expected, the estimates reveal that the composite parameter, q, is always larger than
one. Also, the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, ξ,
is systematically positive — where this elasticity is recovered from the definition q =
1+
(1−ω
ω
)
e(1−ξ)µq , given values of the weight ω, and the estimated values of the mean µq.
The elasticity uniformely declines as the weight of tradable goods in total consumption, ω,
increases. For example, fixing the weight to ω = 0.3 implies that the elasticity averages to
4.589; and it ranges from a low of 1.911 in Sierra Leone to a high of 8.113 in Sri Lanka. In
contrast, setting ω = 0.7 implies that the elasticity averages to 1.935; and it ranges from
a low of 0.114 in Sierra Leone to a high of 4.899 in Sri Lanka.
Likewise, the estimates indicate that the composite parameter, τ , is always larger than one.
Also, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods, ζ, is almost
always positive — where this elasticity is obtained from τ = 1 +
(1−$
$
)
e(1−ζ)µτ , given
values of the weight $, and the estimated values of the mean µτ . The elasticity decreases
as the weight of home tradable goods in total tradable consumption, $, increases. In
particular, fixing the weight to $ = 0.3 implies that the elasticity averages to 4.411; and it
ranges from a low of 2.731 in Tunisia to a high of 8.446 in Sierra Leone. However, setting
$ = 0.7 implies that the elasticity averages to 1.336; and it ranges from a low of -0.575 in
Sri Lanka to a high of 4.440 in Sierra Leone. Overall, the values for the weights, ω and $,
and the elasticities of substitution, ξ and ζ, are consistent with previous findings, where the
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estimates of the weight are around 0.5 and the estimates of the elastiticity of substitution
between imported and non-tradable goods is about 1.3 across selected developing countries
(e.g. Ostry and Reinhart 1992). In these studies, however, the tradable goods are usually
not decomposed into imported and non-imported goods.
For completeness, Table 3 also presents the overidentification restriction tests. The statis-
tics, J , reveal that the restrictions associated with the moment conditions (8) are never
rejected at the 1% level, are refuted at the 5% level for only 3 countries, and at the 10%
level for 2 additional countries.
Figure 2 displays the transitory dynamic responses of external and budget deficits follow-
ing, one standard deviation, shocks. These responses are obtained from our benchmark
ordering: x2,t = ( f ′t at )
′ and ft = ( rt ∆ log τt ∆ log qt ∆ logYt log gt dt )′. In
brief, a positive shock to interest rate leads to positive responses of external and budget
deficits over most horizons, except for Costa Rica, Malaysia, Mauritius, and Pakistan.
A positive shock to terms of trade usually produces negative responses of external and
budget deficits, except for India, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and South Africa. A
positive shock to exchange rate generally implies positive responses of external and budget
deficits, except for Malaysia, Mauritius, and Pakistan. A positive shock to output fre-
quently leads to negative responses of external and budget deficits, except for Honduras,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. A positive shock to government expenditures almost
always yields positive responses of external and budget deficits, except for Nigeria and Sri
Lanka. Finally, a positive shock to budget deficit due to a tax cut yields positive responses
of external and budget deficits over most horizons, except for Nigeria and Sri Lanka.
Importantly, these dynamic responses provide some intuition behind the predicted relation
between external and budget deficits. For example, the various shocks produce responses
of external and budget deficits which are almost always of the same sign. This suggests
that most shocks induce a positive relation between external and budget deficits. In turn,
these relations translate into a positive predicted comovement between external and bud-
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get deficits, as observed in the data. This sharply contrasts with the results obtained from
reduced-form analyses, suggesting that the explanation of the empirical positive covari-
ance between external and budget deficits from the usual external and internal conditions
represents a challenging task (e.g. Calderon, Chong, and Zanforlin 2007; Combes and
Saadi-Sedik 2006; Chinn and Prasad 2003; Calderon, Chong, and Loayza 2002; Roubini
1991; Berg and Sachs 1988).
Also, the various shocks yield responses of external and budget deficits which generally
exhibit a modest persistence. That is, most shocks affect the external and budget deficits
for a horizon of about 5 years, except for India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This suggests that
the different shocks lead to a positive comovement between external and budget deficits
mainly through their short-run effects.
Moreover, the various shocks induce responses of external and budget deficits which display
different magnitudes. For example, a government expenditures shock leads to pronounced
responses of external and budget deficits for many countries. These responses are clearly
the largest (in absolute values) for Costa Rica, Honduras, and Pakistan. In additions,
these responses seem quite large for Mauritius, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia. Also,
an output shock induces large responses of external and budget deficits for Nigeria and
Sri Lanka. Given the measures involved in our covariance decomposition, these results
suggest that shocks to internal conditions represent the prime determinants of the positive
comovements between external and budget deficits for most countries. In contrast, a terms
of trade shock yields the largest responses of external and budget deficits for Malaysia,
while an interest rate shock produces the largest responses for India and South Africa.
These findings suggest that shocks to external conditions constitute the main explanation
of the positive comovements between external and budget deficits for only few countries.
Table 4 confronts the empirical and predicted covariances between external and budget
deficits. These statistics display similar numerical values for almost all countries. Also,
the empirical and predicted covariances are statistically identical at all conventional levels
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for every country, except Tunisia.
Table 4 further reports the estimates of the contribution of each shock to the predicted
covariance between external and budget deficits. Again, these estimates are computed for
our benchmark ordering: x2,t = ( f ′t at )
′ and ft = (rt ∆ log τt ∆ log qt ∆ logYt log gt
dt)′. The estimates are always numerically positive, except those associated with the
portions attributable to the shocks of exchange rate, tax cut, and other factors (summarized
by the adjusted current account) for Nigeria, and interest rate for Mauritius. The positive
contributions of most shocks reflect the notion that the responses of external and budget
deficits are frequently of the same sign. Also, these positive contributions reveal that most
shocks induce a positive relation between external and budget deficits, translating into a
positive predicted comovement between the two deficits.
The contributions also display different sizes across the various shocks. In general, the
magnitude of the contributions indicate that both internal and external conditions play a
role in the determination of the comovement between external and budget deficits. How-
ever, the contributions related to the government expenditures shock represent the largest
numerical values for 7 out of 12 countries, namely Costa Rica, Honduras, Mauritius, Mo-
rocco, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia. Also, the portions attributable to the output
shock are the most important component for 2 countries, that is, Nigeria and Sri Lanka.
But the contributions of the budget deficit shock associated with a tax change never dis-
play the largest numerical values. So far, these results reveal that the shocks associated
with internal conditions, and especially the domestic resources net of public absorptions,
are the most important factors explaining the positive comovement between external and
budget deficits for most countries. These findings confirm the intuition deduced from the
dynamic responses.
In contrast, the contributions related to the interest rate shock reach the largest numerical
values for only 2 countries, namely India and South Africa. Also, the portions attributable
to the terms of trade shock are the most important component for only 1 country, that
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is, Malaysia. In addition, the contributions of the exchange rate shock never exhibit the
largest numerical values. In sum, these findings indicate that the shocks associated with
external conditions play a major role in the determination of the positive comovement
between external and budget deficits for only few countries.
Note that many estimates of the contributions are precisely estimated. Importantly, se-
lecting the contributions with the largest positive, statistically significant (rather than
numerical), values leads to similar results as above. The only differences are the following:
the contribution of the shock to output (rather than government expenditures) becomes
the most important for Morocco, the portion attributable to the shock to budget deficit in-
duced by a tax change (rather than interest rate) is the most crucial for South Africa, while
the contribution of the shock to terms of trade (rather than government expenditures) is
the most dominant for Tunisia. Overall, the findings confirm that the shocks associated
with internal conditions still constitute the prime determinants of the positive relation
between external and budget deficits for most countries, whereas the shocks related to
external conditions remain key factors for few countries.
To check the robustness of the results, Table 5 presents the contributions obtained from
the following ordering: x2,t = ( f ′t at )
′ and ft = (∆ logYt log gt dt rt ∆ log τt ∆ log qt)′.
This alternative ordering places the variables related to internal conditions before those
associated with external conditions, unlike the benchmark ordering. Accordingly, the
alternative ordering assumes that the internal conditions are more predetermined than
the external ones. Importantly, this case may be relevant for many developing economies
which heavily rely on natural resources. This is because the endowment of these resources
is crucially affected by exogenous, and possibly highly predetermined, factors. Examples
of such factors are weather conditions affecting crops for agricultural economies (i.e. Costa
Rica), geological conditions affecting the mining industry (i.e. South Africa), and reserves
of oil affecting the petrolium industry (i.e. Nigeria). All these exogenous factors are
captured by shocks to domestic resources, net of public absorption, in our alternative
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ordering.
For the alternative ordering, the contributions related to the government expenditures
shock now represent the largest numerical values for 9 out of 12 countries, namely Costa
Rica, Honduras, India, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia.
Also, the portions attributable to the output shock are still the most important component
for 2 countries, that is, Nigeria and Sri Lanka. Finally, the contribution of the budget deficit
shock associated with a tax change becomes the largest numerical value for South Africa.
Consequently, these results indicate that the shocks associated with internal conditions
are now the most important factors explaining the positive relation between external and
budget deficits for all countries. Interestingly, these contributions reinforce the conclusion
reached from the benchmark ordering. Moreover, the results suggest that the contributions
obtained from the benchmark ordering can be viewed as providing a lower bound of the
importance of internal conditions in the determination of the positive comovement between
external and budget deficits.
6. Conclusion
This paper documented and explained the positive relation between external and budget
deficits for several developing countries. First, we provide evidence of the existence of a
positive comovement between external and budget deficits. This is consistent with previous
findings obtained from panel regressions. However, our analysis relies on time-series of
external and budget deficits to extract the comovement that is specific to each country.
The estimated covariance between external and budget deficits is numerically positive for
all countries and statistically significant for many cases. Similar results are found from
the estimated correlation between external and budget deficits, and the estimated slope
coefficient obtained by regressing the external deficit on a constant and the budget deficit.
Second, we explain the joint behavior of external and budget deficits from a tractable small
open economy, overlapping generation model with heterogeneous goods. This sharply con-
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trasts with earlier reduced-form studies characterizing the individual behavior of either the
external deficit or budget deficit. Our model offers the advantage of relating external and
budget deficits to the external and internal conditions usually considered for developing
economies. The model further captures different degrees of imperfectness of intergenera-
tional linkages and of financial markets, and as such potential liquidity constraints faced
by developing countries.
Empirically, the model is estimated for each country such that the predicted covariance
between external and budget deficits is close to its empirical counterpart. The predicted
covariance is then decomposed into contributions measuring the portions attributable to
shocks associated with each internal and external conditions. The size of the contributions
indicate that the shocks associated with internal conditions, and especially the domestic
resources net of public absorptions, are the most important factors explaining the positive
comovement between external and budget deficits for most countries. In contrast, the
contributions of the shocks associated with external conditions are dominant for only few
countries.
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Data Appendix
This appendix describes the data which are mainly collected from the International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS), released by the International Monetary Fund. The annual data
cover the longest period since the post-1960 era for our selected developing economies. The
selections of the countries, frequency, and time periods are dictated by the availability of
the data, and in particular of budget deficit and public debt. Table 1 lists the countries
and time periods for which external and budget deficits are available. Table 3 lists the
countries for which all variables required for the estimation exercise are available.
The variables which are central to our analysis are external and budget deficits. The ex-
ternal deficit refers to the negative of the nominal current account in U.S. dollars (source:
IFS) converted in domestic currencies from the appropriate nominal exchange rate (source:
IFS), divided by the nominal gross domestic product in domestic currencies (source: IFS).
The budget deficit is the nominal budget deficit in local currencies (source: IFS), normal-
ized by the nominal gross domestic product.
The predetermined variables are the public debt and net foreign assets. The public debt
is measured from the nominal foreign and domestic public debts of central governments
net of guaranteed loans in domestic currencies (source: IFS), divided by the nominal gross
domestic product. The net foreign assets correspond to the nominal net foreign assets
in U.S. dollars (source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006) expressed in domestic currencies,
normalized by the nominal gross domestic product. Exceptionally, for Sierra Leone the
nominal net foreign assets in U.S. dollars is taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) published by the World Bank.
The forcing variables are the world interest rate, terms of trade, exchange rate, output,
and government expenditures. The world interest rate is proxied by the nominal yield on
three-month US treasury bills (source: IFS) minus the expected inflation, constructed as
the one-step-ahead forecasts of an ARMA(1,1) process for the annual growth rate of the
consumer price index (source: IFS) (e.g. Fry 1986; Uribe and Yue 2006). The terms of
trade are measured from the ratio of export prices to import prices (source: WDI). The
exchange rate corresponds to the real effective exchange rate (source: IFS). Exceptionally,
for Honduras, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka the real effectice exchange rate is taken from
Cashin, Cespedes, and Sahay (2004), while for India the real effective exchange rate is
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published by the Reserve Bank of India. Output is obtained from the nominal gross
domestic product, divided by the consumer price index. The government expenditures are
computed as the nominal government expenditures of services, consumption goods, and
investment goods in domestic currencies (source: IFS), normalized by the nominal gross
domestic product.
The additional variables required for the estimation purpose are taxes and private con-
sumption. Taxes correspond to the ratio of the nominal tax revenues in domestic currencies
(source: IFS) to the nominal gross domestic product. Private consumption is obtained from
the nominal households expenditures of services, nondurable goods, and durable goods in
domestic currencies (source: IFS), normalized by the nominal gross domestic product.
All the variables are linear detrended to ensure stationarity. Similar results are obtained
from alternative detrending methods, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Table 1. Empirical Regularities: Statistics
Country cov corr coeff Country cov corr coeff
Burundi 0.061 0.007 0.007 Pakistan 10.57 0.804 0.728
[1985–2003] (0.968) (0.968) (0.978) [1976–2003] (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Colombia 0.885 0.202 0.448 Papua New Guinea 7.169 0.392 1.538
[1968–2003] (0.269) (0.262) (0.237) [1976–2001] (0.092) (0.038) (0.048)
Costa Rica 7.871 0.624 1.548 Paraguay 1.832 0.285 0.803
[1977–2002] (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) [1975–2001] (0.247) (0.179) (0.150)
Ecuador 3.077 0.355 0.882 Sierra Leone 19.25 0.408 0.694
[1976–2003] (0.025) (0.003) (0.063) [1977–2005] (0.010) (0.000) (0.028)
Honduras 8.013 0.520 0.705 South Africa 1.621 0.215 0.320
[1974–2002] (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) [1960–2003] (0.116) (0.079) (0.161)
India 1.291 0.442 0.150 Sri Lanka 11.81 0.848 0.743
[1975–2001] (0.015) (0.007) (0.021) [1975–2001] (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Kenya 7.884 0.514 0.787 Tanzania 12.54 0.489 0.587
[1975–2003] (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) [1976–2002] (0.003) (0.000) (0.009)
Malaysia 9.938 0.241 0.302 Togo 45.34 0.826 0.750
[1974–1999] (0.269) (0.191) (0.235) [1977–2000] (0.085) (0.000) (0.000)
Mali 11.48 0.764 1.436 Tunisia 6.079 0.606 0.797
[1976–2003] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [1976–1999] (0.002) (0.000) (0.008)
Mauritius 19.94 0.741 0.802 Uganda 0.125 0.027 0.035
[1976–2003] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [1980–2003] (0.899) (0.899) (0.901)
Morocco 15.48 0.823 0.917 Uruguay 1.365 0.234 0.241
[1975–2003] (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) [1978–2001] (0.044) (0.064) (0.270)
Nigeria 11.60 0.276 0.269 Venezuela 14.19 0.686 1.876
[1977–2004] (0.131) (0.072) (0.156) [1970–2001] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note. cov refers to the sample estimates of the empirical covariance (multplied by 10000) between
external and budget deficits. corr is the sample estimates of the correlation between external and
budget deficits. coeff is the OLS estimates of the slope coefficient obtained by regressing the
external deficit on a constant and the budget deficit. Numbers in parentheses are the p-values
associated with t tests that the statistics are null, where these tests involve Newey-West standard
errors. Entries in brackets represent the sample periods.
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Table 2. Economic Environment: Coefficients of Rules
Θpp =
( (1− ρ) −ρ
( ν+ρ
µr+ρ
)
0
( 1
1+µy
)
)
Θzp =
([( µr
1+µy
)
− (ν + ρ)
]
−ρ
( ν+ρ
µr+ρ
)
)′
Θpf =


−(1− ρ)µ(f−b∗) 0
0 0
0 0
(1− ρ)µ(f−b∗) 0
−eµgλ 0
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( ν+ρ
µr+ρ
)
1


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0
)
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0
0
(1− ρ)µ(f−b∗)
−eugλ
−ρ
( ν+ρ
µr+ρ
)
(1 + µy)


′
Θaf =


−(1− eµt)[
eµc
(
1− 1γ
)](
1− 1q
)
−
[
eµc
(
1− 1γ
)](
1− 1τ
)
(1− eµt)− eµc
(
1− 1γ
)
eµg
(ν+ρ
1+ν
)
−ρ
( ν+ρ
µr+ρ
)
(1 + µy)


′
λ = 1−ρ1+ν ν = µr − µy > 0
q = 1 +
(1−ω
ω
)
e(1−ξ)µq τ = 1 +
(1−$
$
)
e(1−ζ)µτ
Note. µy, µq, µτ , µr, µg, µd, µ(f−b∗), uc, and ut are the means of ∆ logYt, log qt, log τt, rt,
log gt, dt, (ft− b∗t ), log ct = log(PtCt/Yt), and log tt = log(Tt/Yt). Also, γ is the reciprocal of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, ξ is the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods, ζ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
tradable goods, ω is the weight of tradable goods in total consumption, $ is the weight of home
tradable goods in total tradable consumption, and ρ is the probability of death.
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Table 3. Results: Estimates of the Structural Parameters
Country ρ γ q τ ω ξ $ ζ J
Costa Rica 0.168 1.116 1.078 1.469 0.3 5.533 0.3 3.285 3.491
(0.169) (0.889) (0.349) (0.738) 0.7 3.277 0.7 0.872 [0.479]
Honduras 0.494 0.871 1.046 1.316 0.3 7.575 0.3 4.934 11.45
(0.006) (0.681) (0.190) (0.524) 0.7 4.743 0.7 1.602 [0.022]
India 0.876 3.142 1.410 1.271 0.3 2.797 0.3 3.259 10.56
(0.065) (0.000) (0.663) (0.301) 0.7 1.045 0.7 1.482 [0.032]
Malaysia 0.566 3.675 1.193 1.434 0.3 5.961 0.3 5.472 6.317
(0.083) (0.975) (0.640) (0.765) 0.7 2.586 0.7 0.969 [0.117]
Mauritius 0.001 5.500 1.500 1.500 0.3 3.507 0.3 3.838 10.58
(0.975) (0.959) (0.814) (0.625) 0.7 0.749 0.7 0.716 [0.032]
Morocco 0.001 3.300 1.500 1.500 0.3 3.435 0.3 3.367 7.248
(0.978) (0.980) (0.881) (0.784) 0.7 0.756 0.7 0.763 [0.123]
Nigeria 0.017 3.268 1.883 1.119 0.3 2.043 0.3 3.585 6.606
(0.866) (0.957) (0.759) (0.057) 0.7 0.225 0.7 2.113 [0.158]
Pakistan 0.125 2.200 1.350 1.500 0.3 3.325 0.3 3.155 5.396
(0.194) (0.851) (0.795) (0.474) 0.7 1.248 0.7 0.784 [0.249]
Sierra Leone 0.948 2.284 1.988 1.100 0.3 1.911 0.3 8.446 9.459
(0.001) (0.099) (0.888) (0.792) 0.7 0.114 0.7 4.440 [0.051]
South Africa 0.001 7.216 1.517 1.067 0.3 4.944 0.3 4.204 4.187
(0.991) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.7 0.508 0.7 2.678 [0.381]
Sri Lanka 0.623 6.727 1.055 1.908 0.3 8.113 0.3 2.979 9.115
(0.434) (0.987) (0.696) (0.879) 0.7 4.899 0.7 -0.575 [0.058]
Tunisia 0.001 0.249 1.125 1.736 0.3 5.921 0.3 2.731 1.652
(0.993) (0.081) (0.076) (0.689) 0.7 3.065 0.7 0.189 [0.799]
Note. ρ, γ, q, and τ are the GMM estimates of structural and composite parameters. ξ
and ζ are obtained from the definitions q = 1+
(1−ω
ω
)
e(1−ξ)µq and τ = 1+
(1−$
$
)
e(1−ζ)µτ ,
given some values of the weights ω and $, and the estimated values of the means µq and
µτ . J is the J -statistic. Numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with t tests
that the estimates are null, where these tests involve Newey-West standard errors. Entries
in brackets are the p-values associated with the χ2 test that the J -statistic is null.
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Table 4. Results: Covariance Decomposition
Country cov −σzd ψr ψτ ψq ψy ψg ψd ψa
Costa Rica 7.871 6.090 0.725 1.260 0.286 0.285 2.449 0.932 0.153
[0.188] (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.055) (0.019) (0.028) (0.090) (0.254)
Honduras 8.013 8.175 1.231 0.278 1.418 0.301 4.574 0.253 0.120
[0.931] (0.000) (0.043) (0.179) (0.029) (0.160) (0.000) (0.123) (0.239)
India 1.291 1.594 0.573 0.237 0.134 0.084 0.130 0.418 0.019
[0.738] (0.079) (0.017) (0.020) (0.000) (0.300) (0.135) (0.268) (0.587)
Malaysia 9.938 10.15 1.803 3.563 0.988 1.444 1.555 0.359 0.436
[0.948] (0.002) (0.204) (0.004) (0.366) (0.330) (0.155) (0.190) (0.322)
Mauritius 19.94 15.22 -0.219 3.369 1.246 0.922 7.559 1.363 0.985
[0.439] (0.012) (0.835) (0.064) (0.238) (0.023) (0.024) (0.613) (0.061)
Morocco 15.48 13.16 1.092 0.669 0.236 0.955 7.486 1.295 1.427
[0.828] (0.218) (0.166) (0.062) (0.802) (0.088) (0.147) (0.711) (0.001)
Nigeria 11.60 11.90 0.679 0.885 -4.929 18.10 2.594 -2.360 -3.102
[0.991] (0.634) (0.912) (0.587) (0.058) (0.000) (0.793) (0.010) (0.612)
Pakistan 10.57 10.38 1.004 3.122 0.103 0.496 4.898 0.504 0.251
[0.958] (0.005) (0.003) (0.028) (0.754) (0.201) (0.007) (0.473) (0.342)
Sierra Leone 19.25 10.80 2.125 0.947 0.895 0.429 4.442 1.274 0.661
[0.701] (0.624) (0.640) (0.159) (0.886) (0.308) (0.809) (0.640) (0.669)
South Africa 1.621 1.972 0.588 0.162 0.017 0.347 0.082 0.582 0.192
[0.959] (0.772) (0.238) (0.003) (0.879) (0.807) (0.985) (0.073) (0.000)
Sri Lanka 11.81 7.705 0.943 1.101 0.308 1.557 1.422 1.366 1.008
[0.430] (0.139) (0.173) (0.275) (0.339) (0.054) (0.258) (0.413) (0.269)
Tunisia 6.079 2.193 0.121 0.080 0.378 0.199 1.353 0.049 0.014
[0.001] (0.058) (0.551) (0.075) (0.522) (0.688) (0.152) (0.586) (0.203)
Note. cov and −σzd refer to the estimates of empirical and predicted covariances (multplied by 10000)
between external and budget deficits. ψ’s are the estimates of components (multplied by 10000) of the
predicted covariance obtained from the ordering rt, ∆ log τt, ∆ log qt, ∆ logYt, log gt, dt, at. Numbers in
parentheses are the p-values associated with χ2 tests that the components are null. Entries in brackets are
the p-values associated with the χ2 test that the difference between empirical and predicted covariances
is null. The tests take into account the uncertainty related to the estimates of structural and composite
parameters, using the δ-method.
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Table 5. Robustness: Covariance Decomposition
Country cov −σzd ψy ψg ψd ψr ψτ ψq ψa
Costa Rica 7.871 6.090 0.973 2.586 1.594 0.635 0.004 0.153 0.153
[0.188] (0.000) (0.014) (0.016) (0.000) (0.006) (0.689) (0.126) (0.254)
Honduras 8.013 8.175 1.565 4.451 0.728 0.243 0.308 0.760 0.120
[0.931] (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.239)
India 1.291 1.594 0.094 0.671 0.568 0.078 0.109 0.054 0.019
[0.738] (0.079) (0.357) (0.002) (0.033) (0.722) (0.360) (0.024) (0.587)
Malaysia 9.938 10.15 4.541 2.189 1.393 0.722 0.816 0.050 0.436
[0.948] (0.002) (0.005) (0.111) (0.025) (0.140) (0.026) (0.804) (0.322)
Mauritius 19.94 15.22 3.655 7.397 2.637 -0.185 0.091 0.644 0.985
[0.439] (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.352) (0.879) (0.456) (0.461) (0.061)
Morocco 15.48 13.16 1.462 7.417 2.797 0.060 0.071 -0.075 1.427
[0.828] (0.218) (0.045) (0.145) (0.498) (0.761) (0.746) (0.858) (0.001)
Nigeria 11.60 11.90 16.39 -1.448 -3.197 1.334 1.234 0.700 -3.102
[0.991] (0.634) (0.000) (0.878) (0.391) (0.845) (0.115) (0.657) (0.612)
Pakistan 10.57 10.38 0.232 7.426 0.379 0.980 0.668 0.441 0.251
[0.958] (0.005) (0.540) (0.003) (0.606) (0.008) (0.342) (0.003) (0.342)
Sierra Leone 19.25 10.80 0.595 6.391 1.715 0.067 1.293 0.051 0.661
[0.701] (0.624) (0.000) (0.608) (0.875) (0.968) (0.297) (0.977) (0.669)
South Africa 1.621 1.972 0.085 0.280 1.382 -0.163 0.037 0.160 0.192
[0.959] (0.772) (0.957) (0.955) (0.000) (0.000) (0.390) (0.000) (0.000)
Sri Lanka 11.81 7.705 0.777 1.600 1.450 0.967 1.167 0.736 1.008
[0.430] (0.139) (0.089) (0.330) (0.369) (0.127) (0.149) (0.068) (0.269)
Tunisia 6.079 2.193 0.291 0.908 0.709 0.134 0.070 0.068 0.014
[0.001] (0.058) (0.054) (0.173) (0.301) (0.172) (0.509) (0.001) (0.203)
Note. cov and −σzd refer to the estimates of empirical and predicted covariances (multplied by 10000)
between external and budget deficits. ψ’s are the estimates of components (multplied by 10000) of the
predicted covariance obtained from the ordering ∆ logYt, log gt, dt, rt, ∆ log τt, ∆ log qt, at. Numbers in
parentheses are the p-values associated with χ2 tests that the components are null. Entries in brackets are
the p-values associated with the χ2 test that the difference between empirical and predicted covariances
is null. The tests take into account the uncertainty related to the estimates of structural and composite
parameters, using the δ-method.
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Figure 1. Empirical Regularities: Data
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Figure 2. Results: Dynamic Responses
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Figure 2 (continued). Results: Dynamic Responses
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the responses of external deficit (budget deficit).
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